

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**SECRET**

25X1

31 March 1952

25X1

OCI No. 5384  
Copy No. 53

**INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**

Document No.	5
No Change In Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed To:	TS S (C)
Auth.: HR 70-2	
Date: 21 July 78	By: <input type="checkbox"/>

25X1

Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**SECRET**

25X1

~~SECRET~~  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Tunisian Crisis

The Tunisian Bey's capitulation on 28 March to French demands to dismiss Prime Minister Chenik and form a new cabinet is not likely to end the present disturbances. The Arab-Asian bloc will increase its pressure for at least a preliminary consideration by the UN Security Council of France's policy in Tunisia. Following the precipitate arrest of the Prime Minister and four members of his cabinet and the imposition of strict security measures, Security Council members who formerly were favorable toward the French position have apparently reconsidered their position. At least six of the seven votes needed to place the question on the Council agenda are assured.

Possibly fearing repercussions throughout North Africa in the event of an international investigation into what France considers an internal affair, the Pinay government authorized a firm line. This move was also intended to strengthen its rightist support, particularly with the Gaullists. Although it now appears that Resident General Hautecloque exceeded his authority in removing the cabinet by force, his action is backed for the present by both the French Government and public opinion.

The new Tunisian Prime Minister, Salah Eddine Baccouche, one of the wealthiest native landowners and a brother-in-law of the Bey, will attempt to restore administrative functions so that French-proposed reforms may be discussed. He is an eminently satisfactory choice from the standpoint of the French, and his former amicable association with the Tunisian nationalists, while Prime Minister in 1943-47, may be strong enough to win the acquiescence of the conservative and moderate nationalists. Extreme nationalists, however, as well as the Communists, will continue public disturbances and attempts to sabotage communications and public utilities. The French troops will probably be able to keep such incidents under control.

Even if the French proposals are accepted in good faith, nationalist demands will not be satisfied with these small gains and agitation will continue until genuine autonomy is obtained. Encouraged by this step forward, nationalists in Morocco, and to a lesser extent in Algeria, will increase their efforts to obtain similar concessions from the French. In order to forestall the outbreak of similar disorders throughout North Africa, the French may be obliged to continue to maintain a disproportionately large military establishment there, which could only be done at the expense of French commitments to NATO.

~~SECRET~~  
**CONFIDENTIAL**